42. We distinguish different kinds of love, but not different kinds of hate. Why not? Some might think because the objects of hatred are more uniform. This was Descartes's view though it is rather implausible; see *The Passions of the Soul* (1649), trans. Robert Stoothoff, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:358, sect. 84.

43. See such surveys as Irving Singer's three-volume *The Nature of Love* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966–88); Denis de Rougemont, *Love in the Western World,* trans. M. Belgion, rev. ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983); and C. S. Lewis, *The Allegory of Love* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936).

Even in our brief discussion of Sartre, one can discern two different conceptions of love. The first—taking its essence as the desire for the full possession of a free being—is what for him makes satisfactory love impossible. But while that definition relies on dubious notions of freedom and possession, he has a second definition—according to which love is equated with the desire to be loved—which seems to me to contain important psychological truth.

44. Given the vast literature on love, it should perhaps be emphasized that hatred too is not to be understood as an isolated sensation. Its ascription similarly involves the summary of much. Even a Cartesian such as Sartre allows for error in relation to certain "states," notably including hatred, that extend over time; see *The Transcendence of the Ego,* trans. Williams and Kirkpatrick (originally published in French 1936–37; New York: NoonDay Press, 1957), 61–68; and *Being and Nothingness,* 162.

45. *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (1921), in *SE* 18:102.

46. There are helpful thoughts on this in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, *Forgiveness and Mercy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988). They start with hatred and ask how it *should* be modified by compassion: tempering justice with mercy, anger and resentment with forgiveness, hate with love. In this discussion I have been starting with love and asking how it *is* (in fact) modified by hatred, anger, and resentment.

47. William Blake, "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," 7–9.

48. I was invited to participate in an American Philosophical Association symposium, "Hatred," in March 1989. I was also invited to participate in an American Academy of Psychoanalysis symposium, "Love," in May 1989. It seemed appropriate to present the same paper to both.

I express (unambivalent) thanks to Norman O. Brown and Lynn Luria-Sukenick.

4

Anger . . . and Anger: From Freud to Feminism

KATHLEEN WOODWARD

I had early discovered . . . that passions often lead to sorrows.
—Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams*

The streets of London have their map; but our passions are uncharted.
—Virginia Woolf, *Jacob's Room*

In this essay I plot a line of development in Freud's thought about the strong emotions, with anger as my focal point. By "strong emotions" I mean those such as fear, hate, triumph, jealousy, horror, greed, and *l'amour fou,* most of which could also be referred to as the "passions" but not all (disgust and shame are examples of strong emotions that we would not term passions). In their intensity, duration, and focus, the strong emotions differ from what I call the quiet emotions (nostalgia, sadness, and tranquillity, for example), the chafing emotions (annoyance, irritation), and the expansive emotions (oceanic feeling, amusement, sympathy).[1]

The passages I've chosen with the strong emotion of anger in view are drawn from *Studies on Hysteria* (1893), *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), "The Moses of Michelangelo" (1914), and *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). I've selected them in great part because, with the exception of *Civilization and Its Discontents,* they focus on what could be termed "professional" relations between people rather than on erotic

wishes, for so long now familiar to us in Freud. The path traced through these four texts leads from feminized hysterical anger to grandiose annihilating anger, from frozen wrath to guilt. It defines a trajectory of emotional development in Freud's work culminating in the containment of the drive of aggressivity (and anger, its emotional representative) by guilt, the quintessential Freudian emotion.

I hope I shall not be understood as suggesting that Freud did not value the emotions. On the contrary, as he asserted clearly in "Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's *Gradiva*" (1907), the emotions are the only valuable things in psychic life.[2] But in general for Freud, the strong emotions are explosive, volatile, dangerous (or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Freud was ambivalent about the strong emotions; certainly it would be more "Freudian" to phrase it this way). Thus at every one of these four points we shall see that one of Freud's major themes is the mechanism that *inhibits* the expression of the strong emotions. In each case it is different: in the first three texts I discuss, Freud considers in turn the inhibition of anger by repression, suppression (the dream-work), and self-control. Ultimately Freud will conclude in *Civilization and Its Discontents* that fire must be fought with fire, emotion with emotion. In the final analysis, then, the controlling emotion—Freud's passion for guilt—is a chilling and paralyzing one.

I am drawn to this subject by my general interest in theories and discourses of the emotions, but more specifically by what may seem at first to bear a rather far-flung relation to Freud: the value placed on the emotion of anger in recent feminist writing in the United States. Anger is the contemporary feminist emotion of choice. I am fascinated by this discursive emphasis on anger. It is indisputably one of the prime examples of the general redistribution of the emotions in terms of gender taking place in contemporary culture. Anger, long associated with men, is being appropriated by women. (Another prime example is grief, an emotion historically linked predominately with women, now being put passionately into discourse by men.)[3] What is entailed by this feminist valorization of anger? At whom or what should it be directed? What tone or shape should it take? What assumptions about anger are contained in this work? What are the limits of anger? I shall take the opportunity to address at least some of these questions at the end of this essay. By returning to Freud I intend to provide a contrasting perspective from which to do so. My project in this essay, then, is to understand more clearly the bases of both discourses of anger—Freudian and feminist—through their differences, and ultimately to test the limitations of each of them through the other.

So, what, I wondered, did Freud have to say about anger? I turned to the index of the *Standard Edition.* Under "anger" I was startled to find virtually no entries. The index did refer me to *Studies on Hysteria* but all of the references were to sections authored by Breuer with the single exception of one attributed to the two of them. This short passage from the "Preliminary Communication" I shall consider in a moment. First, however, I insist on a distinction between anger and aggressivity, a distinction signaled by the Index itself: under "aggressiveness" there are many entries (this may be in part a result of scholars traditionally not being interested in the emotions). Anger is an *emotion,* what in Western culture we understand as an interiorized affective state (other cultures, as anthropologists point out, conceive of emotion as something that exists *between* people, not as something *in* individuals).[4] Aggressivity is a *drive:* to action, to behavior. In his work as a whole Freud placed much more emphasis on a theory of the drives than he did on the emotions. In fact he devoted remarkably little attention to the emotions in comparison, say, with Melanie Klein, whose work is a veritable theoretical atlas of the strong emotions of psychoanalysis. What, then, is the relationship between emotion and aggressivity? Certainly the two are linked but not indissolubly so. We can imagine aggression that does not proceed from feelings of anger or rage or hate. Likewise we can imagine angry feelings that do not eventuate in aggressive behavior toward others; indeed Freud astutely theorized the conversion of aggressivity toward others into self-aggressivity—in the form of an emotion. With these brief observations in mind I turn to *Studies on Hysteria.*

FEMINIZED HYSTERICAL ANGER

Hysteria is associated of course overwhelmingly with women and with the repression of sexual desire, which I understand more precisely as a drive than as an emotion. But in *Studies on Hysteria* Freud does report one case that deals explicitly with the repression of the emotion of anger. I call it the case of the hysterical employee. It is, as we shall see, a case with a distinctly contemporary flavor. Given the traditional understanding of anger as a male emotion, it should not surprise us that this hysterical patient is not a woman but a man. He is furious at his employer who has mistreated him physically and at the legal justice system that has accorded him no redress. What is the outcome of his repression of anger? It erupts hysterically in the guise of "a frenzy of rage" as if its

repression had compressed it into a denser, more volatile force. I quote the entire passage devoted to the scenario:

> an employee who had become a hysteric as a result of being ill-treated by his superior, suffered from attacks in which he collapsed and fell into a frenzy of rage, but without uttering a word or giving any sign of a hallucination. It was possible to provoke an attack under hypnosis, and the patient then revealed that he was living through the scene in which his employer had abused him in the street and hit him with a stick. A few days later the patient came back and complained of having had another attack of the same kind. On this occasion it turned out under hypnosis that he had been re-living the scene to which the actual onset of the illness was related: the scene in the law-court when he failed to obtain satisfaction for his maltreatment. (*SE* 2:14)

For Freud and Breuer this case is an illustration of a hysterical attack that consists only of "motor phenomena" (that is, it does not exhibit a hallucinatory phase). Like other forms of hysteria, the root or precipitating cause is a memory of a psychical trauma, a memory that has been repressed. But of what is the memory? An event? An emotion? A desire?

Although Freud does not say anything more about this case (certainly he does not pretend to adjudicate it), we can assume that he understands it as he does other cases of hysteria: the person afflicted with hysteria must remember and rehearse either his desire or affect (to repeat: I am here associating desire with a drive, affect with an emotion). The psychical trauma, signaled by the symptom of hysterical rage, must be "disposed of by abreaction or by associative thought-activity" (*SE* 2:15).

But on second thought, is there not a significant difference between this case of hysterical anger and a case of hysterical erotic desire? In the latter instance, Freud counsels the assumption and acceptance of sexual desire, which is the manifestation of what he will later understand as the libidinal drive. In effect he approves it. In the case of the hysterical employee, on the other hand, it appears to be the emotion itself—his anger at the legal justice system and at his employer—that is the precipitating factor of the illness. Repressed anger, in other words, may not be a mere symptom of the illness but its very root. Thus it is the anger itself that should be "abreacted," released as it were into the air.

In his essay "The Unconscious" (1915), Freud explains the relation between memory, representation, and emotion this way: "affects and emotions correspond to processes of discharge, the final manifestations

of which are perceived as feelings," while "ideas are cathexes—basically of memory-traces" (178). James Hillman, glossing this passage in *Emotion,* offers the following analogy, which captures perfectly Freud's view of anger as a violent and destructive emotion: "let us conceive of these 'cathexes—ultimately of memory-traces' as bombs. The bombs 'exist' in the unconscious, but the affect as the quantitative explosive potential of the bombs" (53).

Hysteria in this altogether unusual case is not associated with the private sphere (the familiar Freudian bedroom). Rather, it is set in the public sphere (the workplace, courts of law), which in the nineteenth century was the confirmed province of men. Furthermore its unexpected scenario underscores the unequal power relations of men: in this situation, of employer-employee. Freud of course does not address the issue of power. He does not politicize the emotion of anger. But if in general men have the cultural "right" to express their anger, this particular man—an employee—evidently did not. He did not experience "satisfaction" in his anger. Instead his hysterical anger feminizes him.[5]

Today we would likely consider this case in terms of harassment, which turns precisely on the analyzing pivot of unequal power relations with a "superior" or "dominant" taking advantage of a "subordinate." *Acting* on the emotion would be part of the therapy. We would look to the courts for "satisfaction," for redress that was not forthcoming in the nineteenth century. But therapy, not legal action, was Freud's then innovative answer, therapy to exorcise the anger. Psychic repression was the mechanism that Freud theorized had concealed this anger in the first place; as he wrote in "The Unconscious," "to suppress the development of affect is the true aim of repression and . . . its work is incomplete if this aim is not achieved" (178). Therapy in the form of hypnosis would release it. The patient would be purged of the anger that was, in effect, attacking him. Thus in this context anger is understood as a debilitating emotion. In *Studies on Hysteria* both the psychic mechanism of repression and the corresponding treatment of hypnosis have as their goal the effacement or catharsis of the self-destructive emotion of anger. As we know, Freud was soon to reject hypnosis as ineffective.

GRANDIOSE ANNIHILATING ANGER

In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud explores another psychic mechanism which inhibits the emotions: the dream-work. It serves to

suppress and *dilute* the emotions, thereby allowing them to be staged in the dream. If in the case of the hysterical employee the diagnostic complement of repression is hypnosis, here the diagnostic complement of the dream-work is the analysis of the dream mass into its dream-thoughts. But within the context of my emphasis on anger, the term "dream-passions" would seem a far more appropriate term than "dream-thoughts." Freud's conviction is that analysis will ultimately allow the strong emotions to present themselves and that, as a result, they will be resolved into a calming order.

One dream in particular is relevant here. In the important section on "Affects in Dreams" Freud analyzes at quite some length the "emotional storm" released by what we have come to refer to as the "Non Vixit" dream. I quote it in full:

> *I had gone to Brücke's laboratory at night, and, in response to a gentle knock on the door, I opened it to* (the late) *Professor Fleischl, who came in with a number of strangers and, after exchanging a few words, sat down at his table. . . . My friend Fl.* [Fliess] *had come to Vienna unobtrusively in July. I met him in the street in conversation with my* (deceased) *friend P., and went with them to some place where they sat opposite each other as though they were at a small table. I sat in front at its narrow end. Fl. spoke about his sister and said that in three quarters of an hour she was dead, and added some such words as "that was the threshold." As P. failed to understand him, Fl. turned to me and asked me how much I had told P. about his affairs. Whereupon, overcome by strange emotions, I tried to explain to Fl. that P. (could not understand anything at all, of course, because he) was not alive. But what I actually said—and I myself noticed the mistake—was,* "NON VIXIT." *I then gave P. a piercing look. Under my gaze he turned pale; his form grew indistinct and his eyes a sickly blue—and finally he melted away. I was highly delighted at this and I now realized that Ernst Fleischl, too, had been no more than an apparition, a "revenant"; and it seemed to me quite possible that people of that kind only existed as long as one liked and could be got rid of if someone else wished it.* (*SE* 5:421)

About this angry dream I want to make three points. First, Freud's fantasy in the "Non Vixit" dream—it is surely grandiose—is that his anger is itself a lethal weapon. Related to this is his implication that the dream-work, which serves to suppress (not repress) affect in the first place, may ultimately work to magnify it.

To me the most memorable aspect of the "Non Vixit" dream is the "scene of annihilation" (520) where Freud "acts" on his anger, exterminating his friend with a wounding glance, causing him as if in some bizarre science fiction film to liquefy and finally to evaporate into nothing, leaving no bodily trace. This Freud analyzes as a reversal of the very same treatment he had once received from his employer-teacher Brücke who had chastised him for his renowned tardiness as an assistant in his lab.[6] Here, then, the anger of the professor provokes the anger of the student. Elsewhere in *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud vividly describes this event, which so clearly had a mortifying effect on his self-esteem:

> One morning he turned up punctually at the hour of opening and awaited my arrival. His words were brief and to the point. But it was not they that mattered. What overwhelmed me were the terrible blue eyes with which he looked at me and by which I was reduced to nothing. . . . No one who can remember the great man's eyes, which retained their striking beauty even in his old age, and who has ever seen him in anger, will find it difficult to picture the young sinner's emotions. (422)

In the case of the hysterical employee, the anger of his employer (who, as we recall, beat his subordinate with a stick) provoked the employee's anger. The employee took his grievance to the courts where, however, he found no "satisfaction" (*SE* 2:14). The result is that the employee turned the anger against himself, making himself physically sick. In the case of the "Non Vixit" dream, anger also calls forth anger. But here the comparison ends. The anger is wildly out of proportion. Freud *was* late. Moreover, anger is vented in fantasy that does result in satisfaction and delight. What an amazing phenomenon is the dream!

Indeed the grandiose fantasy of the dream is that anger is itself a firearm, that Freud's anger is so powerful the mere expression of it constitutes murderous aggression. An emotion is converted into a physical force in fantasy. Freud succeeds in destroying his friend with a laserlike look of piercing anger. To his shame. And to his anxiety. For might he not expect retaliation in an endless escalation of anger and action?

In his discussion of the "Non Vixit" dream Freud repeatedly refers to the "raging" of the emotions that accompany it. To my mind the high degree of its emotional intensity is its most striking feature, especially given Freud's argument in this section of *The Interpretation of Dreams*

that the dream-work serves to weaken or dilute the emotions, to bring "about a suppression of affects" (467). As he puts it elsewhere in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* "the purpose for which the censorship exercises its office and brings about the distortion of dreams" is "*in order to prevent the generation of anxieties and other forms of distressing affect*" (267). The dream-work itself must therefore possess great power, as is underscored in Freud's vivid description of it: "the whole mass of these dream-thoughts is brought under the pressure of the dream-work, and its elements are turned about, broken into fragments and jammed together—almost like pack-ice" (312). Freud pictures the resulting dream as a dense, cold mass of different elements that have been fused together. When I read this passage I think of the dream-work in terms of my high school atomic physics, of fission and fusion, the particles of the dream-thoughts being smashed together with a force inconceivable in terms of the weights and measures, the pulleys and levers, of everyday life. Imagine, then, the force in turn required to separate these elements, a force equivalent to that of an atom smasher. More, imagine the emotional storm that would then be released.

Second, given that the emotional world of the "Non Vixit" dream is far more complicated than that of the case of the hysterical employee (which revolves around the single emotion of anger), how does Freud explain his anger (which was, he tells us, "strange")? What accounts for his overwhelming sense of emotional strangeness? In part it may be due to the eerie feeling arising from the altogether peculiar situation of addressing a person who is in fact dead. But more fundamentally, I think, what struck Freud as "strange" was the complex of *contradictory* strong emotions released by the dream.

In his analysis of the dream-mass, Freud focuses on the different categories of emotions—what he calls the "various qualities" of affect—that accompanied it at two nodal points: "hostile and distressing" feelings when he "annihilated" his friend and enemy with two words and a piercing look, and feelings of "delight" and "satisfaction" at the end of the dream when he realized not only that such people could be eliminated whenever one (he) wanted but even more pleasurably, that such aggressivity was justified (480). Thus what may have been particularly troubling to Freud was the presence of contradictory emotions with regard to the same person. As we know, this emotional knot would come to be one of Freud's decisive contributions to a theory of strong attachments: that they are characterized by binary emotions, with love and hate being the primary pair.

We should not be surprised to learn, therefore, that later in his analysis

of the "Non Vixit" dream Freud traces the roots of the pattern of his present-day intense emotional relationships to his colleagues and friends back to the *emotional world* of his early childhood, to his relationship with his nephew John who was a year older than he was, his "senior" and "superior" (483). As Freud observes earlier in *The Interpretation of Dreams,* "Until the end of my third year we had been inseparable. We had loved and fought with each other; and this childhood relationship . . . had a determining influence on all my subsequent relations with contemporaries" (424). In relation to the "Non Vixit" dream one childhood memory (or fantasy) in particular of his nephew returns to Freud: when Freud, not yet even two years old, is interrogated by his father for hitting his playmate. Freud's defense? "I hit him 'cos he hit me" (484). Notice that retaliation against a "superior" is at issue, one of Freud's dominant fantasies. In his discussion of the "Non Vixit" dream Freud concluded, "My emotional life has always insisted that I should have an intimate friend and a hated enemy" (483). Thus in adulthood the personal intersects (or perhaps more accurately, infects) the professional, upping the ante of emotional engagement. We should not fail to note that the site of the first part of the dream is Brücke's laboratory where Freud had worked and that all of the major figures in the dream are men. Here again anger is gendered male.

Third, given Freud's emphasis on the intensity of the emotions (in particular his annihilating anger), it is peculiar to me that nowhere in his analysis does he name the emotion of guilt, which will become so central to his thought later on. Instead he repeatedly uses the word "reproach" (the reproach of others and self-reproach). With reproach we seem to find ourselves in a novel of manners rather than in a tragedy or a romance of passion. Reproach is one of the chafing emotions, not one of the strong or quiet emotions. Reproach implies disapproval, rebuke, reproval. Thus it is primarily a social emotion. And as a social emotion, it is altogether in keeping with Freud's emphasis on shame in his analysis of the "Non Vixit" dream.[7] Shame implies an external, observing other as opposed to guilt, which implies an internalized, observing other (although Freud does mention self-reproach, he does not identify it as guilt, which, as we will see, he will ultimately come to associate with an action that is *not* taken, only fantasized). Thus in the short history of the emotions that I am sketching here, guilt seems to emerge later than shame in the development of Freud's thought. Or, we might speculate that the emotion of guilt was too distressing for Freud at this point in his life, that in the "Non Vixit" dream it could only escape the censorship of the dream-work under the guise of shame.

"FROZEN WRATH"

In *Studies on Hysteria* we encounter a hysterical man whose frenzied attacks of rage physically mimic his anger, reducing him to a feminized position. His rage and his body are out of control. Repression is ultimately an ineffective mechanism for containing anger. In the "Non Vixit" dream, the dream-work (which is, like repression, an unconscious process) serves both to suppress and stage that anger. If the anger is out of proportion to the event that prompted the dream, nonetheless the phenomenon of the dream allows the safe and satisfying expression of aggressive fantasies entailed by anger. Furthermore, the phenomenon of analysis puts those emotions into perspective. In my third text, "The Moses of Michelangelo," Freud considers an altogether different mechanism for the control of anger, one that is conscious, indeed self-conscious.

The relay between the affect of anger and destructive action is Freud's subject in "The Moses of Michelangelo." As his analytic point of departure he takes his own powerful reaction of "intellectual bewilderment" (also a preferred Freudian emotion) on repeated viewings of Michelangelo's sculpture of Moses. Freud comes to the conclusion that Michelangelo brilliantly rewrote the scriptural history of anger embodied by Moses. Similarly, we may read Freud's essay as a rewriting of his own evolving thought on the emotion of anger, in particular, its containment.

It is a question of reading for the plot, of the timing of action and emotion. As Freud remarks, the seated figure of Moses is traditionally understood to be represented in a state of anger incipient to ruinous behavior, that he is on the verge of bounding up and hurling down the Tables of the Law, demolishing them in a single furious gesture. Freud, however, reads the plot differently. He advances Moses and his audience in time. He concludes that Moses has already half-risen in his rage, only to stop his angry action and return to a state of wrathful immobility, or "frozen wrath" (*SE* 13:229). The heat of passion is chilled to the sculptural bone. Moses resists the temptation to act on "rage and indignation," which would have been "an indulgence of his feelings" and would have entailed the annihilation of the Law. He "controlled his anger," "he kept his passion in check" (229–30).

For Freud the statue expresses "the passage of a violent gust of passion visible in the signs left behind it in the ensuing calm" (236). It is precisely this tension between the quietude of Moses's exterior aspect and the interior storm of his rage that arrested Freud's eye. How does Freud explain the ability of Moses to contain his anger? For Freud it is a matter of character, of the attachment of Moses to a higher cause to which he has consciously pledged himself. It is, in other words, a matter of self-discipline. Thus for Freud, Moses is a figure of heroic restraint, all the more noble for his wrath and the powerful self-control that countervails it. The implication is that Moses's control of his anger, rather than his indulgence of it, allows him to fulfill his responsibilities as a leader to his religious community. At this point I suspect I hardly need draw attention to the fact that the nobility of frozen wrath is gendered male.

GUILT

In his dedication to a higher cause and in his prodigious self-control, Freud's Moses is larger than human, an incarnation of a mental and moral ideal, a figure who upholds the law of the land. Few could be expected to succeed in following his example. I turn, then, to my fourth and final Freudian text, *Civilization and Its Discontents*, in which Freud theorizes a different mechanism to counter aggressivity. Here, to be sure, Freud does not directly address anger as an emotion. Instead he deals with the drive of aggressivity to which he believed all human beings are subject and which he regarded as the greatest impediment to civilization. (As I read human history and today's papers filled with the fighting in Bosnia and hate crimes in Germany, nothing seems so indisputable.)

That there is a clear connection between anger and aggressivity is suggested by the infamous prehistorical fable of the primal origin of guilt that Freud offers in *Totem and Taboo* (1913) and to which he returns in *Civilization and Its Discontents*. It is a scenario of power, sexual desire, and the strong, indeed primal emotions. Freud, as we recall, hypothesizes that civilization began when the sons of the despotic father (he had denied them sexual access to women) banded together in hatred and killed him—and ate his body.

What can restrain the drive to aggressivity, particularly when it is inflamed by the strong, divisive emotions? *In Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud argues that so powerful is the drive to aggressivity that the sense of guilt emerges to counter its force. Indeed the drive to aggressivity, when introjected, becomes guilt; there is a kind of mathe-

matical principle of conversion between drives and emotions at work. Guilt is thus for Freud arguably the most important achievement of civilization.

Much of *Civilization and Its Discontents* is devoted to a consideration of the etiology and origin of guilt on the levels of the individual and of the group. I shall not rehearse the complex trajectory of Freud's argument, which is in any case well known. Here I shall instead confine myself to three points, hoping to gain in clarity what I may lose in simplification. First, in Freud's world the emotion of guilt is not understood as a technology of control or a disciplinary technique in the Foucauldian sense, imposed by a historically specific set of discourses and institutions. Rather for Freud the regulating emotion of guilt emerges inevitably from a primal psychology of the emotions, from the tension or ambivalence between hate and love, the emotional representatives of the two basic drives: the drive to aggressivity (power) and the libidinal drive (sexual desire). In Freud's view guilt is both genetic and structural to the human psyche from the moment of the constitution of civilization (that is, the founding moment of the sons revolting against the father). If love and hate are the two primary emotions, guilt is a secondary emotion, entailing self-consciousness. Guilt is the third term, unsettling and oppressive yet paradoxically also stabilizing. Like a point on a nuclear thermostat, guilt works homeostatically to maintain a fluctuating equilibrium between love and hate, to regulate the temperature, to keep things cool.

Second, we should note that the prehistorical paradigm on which Freud bases his theory of the constitution of civilization (out of hatred) and the emergence of guilt (out of love) is gendered male. The sons, who fiercely love the father as much as they hate him, internalize the father as their superego, turning aggressivity—and anger—against themselves.

Third, for Freud the sense of guilt is produced from hostile feelings that are *not* acted upon (Freud ultimately reserves the term "remorse" for the emotion one experiences after one *has* committed an act of aggression). Concomitantly the sense of guilt is, startlingly, often unconscious. It is what I call a disabling emotion. Guilt is simultaneously an inhibition of aggressivity and an exacting, gnawing punishment for aggression in fantasy. I find this a stunning conclusion: an emotion is itself a self-punishment for what has *not* taken place. Guilt inhibits the development of anger—before it even exists. Thus if for Freud the sense of guilt is "the most important problem in the development of civilization, " in the final analysis it may also represent a crippling, enervating limit to it

(*SE* 21:134). In Freud's etiology of guilt, we find implicit a catastrophe theory of the emotions—and of civilization. If the sense of guilt is at first stabilizing, at a certain limit it may become radically destabilizing. This is because Freud theorizes that the larger the group or community, the more intense the guilt, the greater its quotient.[8] We are presented with a dismaying future, one in which the burden of guilt (which inhibits the expression of anger) grows heavier and heavier, a future we may have come close to realizing today as transnational corporate structures and communication networks circle the globe, drawing everyone more tightly together. The sense of guilt may become so onerous, Freud suggests, as to be intolerable, not only for the individual but for civilization as a whole, rendering culture neurotic, crippled. As he writes in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* "the price we pay for our advance in civilization is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt" (134). But if Freud theorizes the "fatal inevitability" of guilt (132), we may conclude that at its limit condition guilt carries with it an inevitable fatality, manifesting itself as "a tormenting uneasiness, a kind of anxiety" on the level of the individual and a "malaise" on the level of society or civilization as a whole (135).

At its limit condition then, guilt, the emotion that makes possible the survival and development of civilization, may devolve into anxiety, which is, according to Freud, perhaps the most fundamental and primitive of all the emotions.[9] As he points out, "the sense of guilt is at bottom nothing else but a topographical variety of anxiety" (*SE* 21:135). Thus if Freud is ambivalent about the strong emotions, he is equally ambivalent about guilt.

The trajectory I have traced in Freud's thought about anger finds its endpoint in guilt, an emotion that, as I read Freud, is highly individualizing and isolating. Guilt turns us back on ourselves. Guilt separates us from one another. Guilt inhibits us from anger and aggressive action—and in the final analysis not just from action but also from pleasure. (I am thinking here in particular of Freud's somber text "A Disturbance of Memory on the Acropolis" which he published six years after *Civilization and Its Discontents* in 1936 when he was eighty years old. In it Freud broods on guilt as a paralyzing impediment to a past pleasure. He also presents guilt as casting a long shadow into the dubious future as a fateful emotion: in Freud's view of the emotions they "belong" not just to the past, but also to the future.)[10]

If Freudian guilt is isolating and individualizing, feminist anger is conceived in precisely the opposite terms. It is presented as an emotion that

will not only be the basis for a group but will also politicize the group, as an emotion furthermore that is created in a group, as an emotion that is enabling of action, not inhibiting of it. In Freud anger is gendered as male but Freud does not unambiguously approve it. The weight of his work is on containing and regulating violent anger, on de-authorizing male anger. Conversely the work of feminists appropriates male anger, using it to establish the authority with which to challenge patriarchal culture. Thus in this discursive circulation of anger in Freud and feminism, we find anger being redistributed in terms of gender. In the rest of this essay I turn to anger as the quintessential contemporary feminist emotion, drawing on a selection of essays that have been published in the last fifteen years in the United States by feminist literary critics and philosophers. The essays by literary critics Jane Marcus, Carolyn Heilbrun, and Brenda Silver all focus on Virginia Woolf. The three by philosophers Naomi Scheman, Elizabeth Spelman, and Alison Jagger revolve in great part around the relation of emotion to epistemology, and make the case for the cognitive dimension of the emotions.

Woolf's *A Room of One's Own* (1928) is the founding text of feminist literary criticism in the United States. It was published just two years before *Civilization and Its Discontents,* when Woolf was forty-six. One of its most remarkable passages is a scene that dramatizes and analyzes feminist anger. The setting is the British Museum where the author has gone one afternoon to do research for her upcoming lecture "Women and Fiction" (which is, of course, the subject of *A Room*). While reading the hypothetical *Mental, Moral, and Physical Inferiority of the Female Sex* by Professor Von X, she finds herself, like an unruly student, absentmindedly, "unconsciously," drawing a picture of him, a picture that reveals to her both his anger *and* hers:

> A very elementary exercise in psychology, not to be dignified by the name of psycho-analysis, showed me, on looking at my notebook, that the sketch of the angry professor had been made in anger. Anger had snatched my pencil while I dreamt. But what was anger doing there? Interest, confusion, amusement, boredom—all these emotions I could trace and name as they succeeded each other throughout the morning. Had anger, the black snake, been lurking among them? Yes, said the sketch, anger had. It referred me unmistakably to the one book, to the one phrase, which had roused the demon; it was the professor's statement about the mental, moral and physical inferiority of women. My heart had leapt. My cheeks had burnt. I had flushed with anger. There was nothing specially remarkable, however foolish, in that. One does not like to be told that one is naturally the inferior of a little man. . . . One has certain foolish vanities. It is only human nature, I reflected, and began drawing cartwheels and circles over the angry professor's face till he looked like a burning bush or a flaming comet—anyhow, an apparition without human semblance or significance. The professor was nothing now but a faggot burning on the top of Hampstead Heath. Soon my own anger was explained and done with; but curiosity remained. How explain the anger of the professors? (40–41)

Woolf astutely concludes that the anger of the professors is a self-offensive mechanism (the phrase is mine) adopted by those in power (men); anger is used as a weapon to fortify their position, to create others as inferior. In a chain reaction her anger is provoked by his: "I had been angry because he was angry."

I am reminded here of the "Non Vixit" dream: Freud's anger at his angry professor results in his wishful dream of annihilating his friend and colleague with a lethal glance of anger. As we saw, Freud traces his aggressive impulses back to his early childhood. Similarly, Woolf defaces "her" professor in daydreaming fantasy, doodling, doodling, until he goes up in flames. Her analysis of anger, however, is not psychological but political. What Freud did not take into account in the case of the hysterical employee—abusive, unequal relations of power—Woolf places at the center of her analysis of gender relations; at the root of the matter is the injustice at the heart of patriarchy. We can understand her anger as an instance of what Jagger calls "outlaw" emotions, emotions experienced by those who are oppressed and who thus have what Jagger argues is an "epistemological privilege" with regard to the authority or appropriateness of their emotions. I cannot take up the argument for "epistemological privilege" in this essay. I turn instead to the tone of Woolf's anger, which is in fact the subject of Silver's essay.

Woolf presents her anger as light, even charming. She writes in ironic tones leavened with a deft touch of melodramatic self-humor. Her anger is altogether palatable. "Had anger, the black snake, been lurking among them?" she writes. "Soon my own anger was explained and done; but curiosity remained." Woolf leaves her anger behind, she tells us (although I do not completely believe her). She casts it off to pursue thought "dispassionately."

Actually I have exaggerated. Woolf's anger is not so easily swallowed by everyone. The three literary critics I've mentioned strongly disap-

prove of what they take to be this "feminine" expression of anger. They prefer the flatout anger of Woolf's *Three Guineas* (1938), a political tract on the economic and social position of women and war. For Marcus, the Woolf of *Three Guineas* is, wonderfully, in "a towering rage"; she relishes the image of Woolf as "an angry old woman," a "witch, making war, not love, untying the knots of social convention, encouraging the open expression of hostilities" (123, 135). (Old? Woolf was only fifty-nine at the time, but that is another subject). For Heilbrun, her own early preference for *A Room of One's Own* over *Three Guineas* is a cause for shame. She revels in Woolf's "unladylike" tone in *Three Guineas,* the text where finally Woolf "was able to indulge the glorious release of letting her anger rip" (241). Heilbrun sees this as an achievement all the more impressive because "like all women," she says, Woolf "had to fight a deep fear of anger in herself" (241). For both Heilbrun and Marcus, the Woolf of *Three Guineas* finally allows anger to drive her art, her writing. Marcus especially is impassioned on this point. Although she acknowledges that thought must accompany anger in the making of art, her own rhetoric belies her preference for anger. Marcus: "we must finally acknowledge that it was anger that impelled her art, and intellect that combed out the snarls, dissolved the blood clots, and unclogged the great sewer of the imagination, anger" (138).

Silver shows how the issue of the authority of feminist anger has driven the reception of *Three Guineas* ever since it was published, for many years impeding the serious consideration of its ideas (Woolf is *too* angry, many readers concluded). But with the emergence of essays by Marcus, Heilbrun, and others, Silver argues, anger, *expressed angrily,* has been recuperated. Flat-out anger has been established as "righteous" and "prophetic"; in short, as unambiguously and purely political. Woolf's anger is no longer heard as "neurotic, morbid, or shrill" (need I add "hysterical"?), but as the expression of "an ethical or moral stance" (361). Silver accepts Scheman's argument that from this perspective the expression of anger itself is a political act. Scheman: from a feminist point of view, anger is "moved away from guilt, neurosis, or depression, and into the purview of cognition, external behavior, social relations, and politics. To become angry, to recognize that one has been angry, to change what counts as being angry becomes a political act" (362).

It would be inaccurate to say that Freud regarded the strong emotions as "irrational," although as we have seen, he did view anger and aggressivity as disruptive to the fragile ties binding civilization together. He firmly believed, as he wrote in *Civilization and Its Discontents,* that "instinctual passions are stronger than reasonable interests" (112). Feminist philosophers reject the view of anger as "irrational." They argue for the cognitive dimension of the emotions in general, using anger as their prime example and the relation between oppressor and oppressed as their paradigm. As Spelman puts it, "there is a politics of emotion: the systematic denial of anger can be seen in a mechanism of subordination, and the existence and expression of anger as an act of insubordination" (270). For Spelman, anger—as opposed to rage, which is anger in excess—has "clarity of vision" (271).

In contradistinction to Freud's emphasis on anger and aggressivity as disruptive to social bonds, here anger is the basis for a political (action) group (however vaguely defined). On this point Scheman's reflections are especially challenging, persuasively so, to the Freudian discourse of the emotions. She argues that in the social context of, for example, a consciousness-raising group, the "discovery of anger can often occur not from focussing on one's feeling but from a political redescription of one's situation" (77). Thus from a feminist perspective, it is not the Freudian case that emotions are located inside us, repressed, as if they were highly idiosyncratic personal property only waiting to be discovered. Rather, they are created in the group. Moreover, they can be created *retrospectively,* as it were. A woman may, for example, retroactively identify as anger her emotional state in the past even though she did not feel anger then. In this view it is not the Freudian case that she had *repressed* her anger and it is only now coming to the surface. Rather, the emotion is being projected from the present into the past. Emotions from a feminist perspective are thus *conscious* social constructions.

One of the most thought-provoking questions posed by Freud about the emotions is, How are they transmitted? (In *Totem and Taboo* he assumes that guilt is an "emotional heritage" that is experienced long after the primal act of parricide has been committed. But how?) One of the answers I would give to this question today is that emotions are transmitted through discourse. The feminist essays to which I've referred constitute a significant case in point. They are intended to create a politicized community out of their readers. They are the scholarly equivalent of the consciousness-raising group. Anger is generated, sustained, and strengthened through discourse—or at least that is the goal. But on further thought, I suspect that really is *not* the goal; the commitment to feminist principles of analysis is. After all, can emotion be located *in* discourse? Nothing would seem more impossible. Thus it is the word "anger" and not necessarily the emotion to which it refers that in fact constellates the group. Scholarly feminist "anger" is a discursive site around which persons cluster who have similar if not the same objec-

tives. Thus feminist literary criticism looks back through its mothers and constructs its own discursive tradition: a literature of anger. Marcus is explicit on this point: in her essay she moves from the anger of Virginia Woolf when she was older, to the anger of the middle-aged Adrienne Rich in her poem "The Phenomenology of Anger" to—this is Marcus's challenge—the anger of the young ("Why wait until old age . . . ? Out with it. No more burying our wrath" [153]). What is the relation of writing to feminist "anger"? Often writing is itself the action.

In *Civilization and Its Discontents* Freud perceptively observes that "a feeling can only be a source of energy if it is itself the expression of a strong need" (72). Women have so long been identified with the emotions, albeit *not* with anger, that I find it fascinating an emotion should be the basis for a rallying cry for solidarity, even if—or more accurately precisely because—that emotion has long been identified as the forbidden fruit (or snake, to allude to Woolf). In the case of women it is clear that there is a strong need to resist patriarchal injustice. To do so we have needed to assert our cultural right to anger. But what are the consequences of flat-out anger? This is the question to which Freud in great part devoted himself and which he answered with great wisdom in *Civilization and Its Discontents.* This is also the very question that (to my knowledge at least) is not entertained at any length in this feminist work. To my mind this is the question to which we need to turn today, especially since certain styles of anger are being advised as *better.* Silver too concludes that today "feminist criticism stands in a problematic relationship to the authority of anger that infused its early rhetoric and vision" (367). She ends by saying that "there is no one feminist anger, and no one appropriate to its end," that "all these angers, all these voices are necessary to feminist critique today" (370). After her astute inquiry into anger and her careful scholarship from a historical perspective, this conclusion strikes me as too cautious. What does Silver give as examples of problematic effects of feminist anger? That the convention of scholarly discourse inhibits it. That male literary critics are still critical of it. That feminists of color critique white middle-class feminists for it. I would rather call these effects, not serious consequences. Interestingly enough, they are confined largely to discourse.

I have two major objections to the advocacy of anger, particularly as it assumes the form of the angry expression of anger. One objection is primarily theoretical, the other primarily practical and historical. If Freud's theory of the emotions is limited in his insistence on the psychological interiorization of the emotions, if he does not recognize the cognitive or political value of emotions, nonetheless his work provides

us with ways in which to understand the limits we have reached today in theorizing the emotion of anger from a feminist perspective.

As we recall, in his analysis of the "Non Vixit" dream Freud was concerned with dissecting the complex of "strange emotions" that accompanied it, separating out the different emotions from one another, isolating them, identifying them, as if they were precipitants in a chemical experiment. What he discovered was not only the diverse emotions of anger and shame, triumph and anxiety, but also that in life, as opposed to analysis, the emotions are bound indissolubly together, that they exist in compound form. For Freud, ultimately there is no such thing as pure anger or pure shame. In his homeostatic view of the strong emotions, a (strong) hostile emotion will be accompanied by its antidote. The converse also holds: a (strong) positive emotion, like love, will be accompanied by its opposite. For Freud our strong emotions are ambivalent, our motives mixed.

That we should interrogate our wishes for their unconscious components is so fundamental to Freud as to be unnecessary to relearn it here. I need hardly add that this is a perspective that is lacking in the feminist work I have been surveying.[11] I consider this a significant shortcoming but that is not my point. My point is that anger as a "political" emotion does not exist in a pure form. Emotions come in clusters.[12]

Scheman uses the word "confused" to describe something similar but in the final analysis quite different. "If we are confused about our emotions," she writes, "those emotions themselves are confused" (179). Her argument here is that the confusion is a sign of a pre-political state, that we must identify these emotions, *name* them, as a way of understanding our position. With this I agree. Her implication if not explicitly drawn conclusion, however, is that in resolving the confusion, one emotion—anger—will ultimately emerge with the clarity of clearly drawn lines. The scenario she offers is that of a nonfeminist becoming politicized in a consciousness-raising group. Thus in this scenario, out of confusion the emotion of guilt appears first; guilt is then interpreted as a "cover for those other feelings, notably feelings of anger" (177). In this scenario, pre-politicized guilt must disappear to allow a politicized anger to appear. I do not disagree with the pragmatic value of this strategy (for that is what it is). But I am insisting that a pure and righteous politicized anger will be accompanied by other emotions as well, precisely because the emotion of anger will no doubt be an "action."

This brings me to my second objection. In the essays to which I have been referring the paradigm of oppressor-oppressed is key. It is argued that oppression can be identified by anger, and that it should be re-

sponded to by anger. But what happens then? We need to advance the scenario in time, interrogating the consequences of letting one's anger rip (Heilbrun). We must focus on the longer view, on the "plot" of anger, looking ahead in time as did Freud in "The Moses of Michelangelo." Anger as an "outlaw" emotion (Jagger) is appropriate when associated with the position of the oppressed. But as we grow older, relations of authority almost inevitably shift. For feminists in the academy, power relations have undergone an indisputable sea change in the last fifteen years. Many women who entered the academy under the banner of the politics of anger find themselves today in positions of authority, responsible to many others. The title of a recent talk by Scheman, "On Waking Up One Morning and Finding That We Are Them," gestures toward this phenomenon. For this generation, which is my generation, "righteous," habit-forming anger, once understood as a "right," can take on the shape of abusive arrogance. "Anger" may be appropriate as a tool of politicization but after this inaugurated point in time flat-out anger is a blunt instrument. Expressions of anger in public discourse (in essays, in debate) can have very different consequences from expressions of anger in the close quarters of the classroom, for example, where flat-out anger can produce a flashpoint, escalating personal conflict. Thus we need a historical perspective on the uses of anger. If the assertion of the authority of anger in the academic community (the humanities in particular) has had enabling consequences at a certain point in time, that time has largely passed. The paradigm of oppressor-oppressed, once so useful to feminism, is producing serious consequences of its own in terms of generational politics within feminism. With this paradigm in hand, younger women in the academy, for example, analyze their position in relation to older women "in power" as that of the oppressed, their anger authorized by their "epistemological privilege" of being a student or an assistant professor. Never mind that the general paradigm of oppressor-oppressed is inappropriate in this case. Certainly from this perspective "anger" senselessly divides women from one another, creating smaller, oppositional groups. This is indeed a serious consequence of the politics of the authority of anger.

I end with a question that has been recurring for several months. It is a question I cannot answer but can only pose. We speak approvingly of self-reflexive thought, of thought that turns back on itself, interrogating its foundations, its principles, its implications, its consequences. Is there an analogy to self-reflexive thought in the domain of the strong emotions? For Freud anger is inhibited, or regulated, by guilt; in *Civilization and Its Discontents* he offers a homeostatic view of the strong emotions. In Freud's view, passions lead often to sorrows. But this system operates unconsciously. It is not consciously self-reflexive. One of the important contributions of feminist thought is the theorization of the cognitive dimension of the emotions. Here we come close, I think, to considering the emotions in a self-reflexive way. But the long-term consequences of the feminist passion for anger, to allude to the epigraph from Virginia Woolf with which I opened this essay, remain "uncharted."

NOTES

1. I borrow the term the "expansive emotions" from Edith Wharton's *The House of Mirth.*

2. As Freud states it in "Delusions and Dreams," "We remain on the surface so long as we are dealing only with the memories and ideas. What is alone of value in mental life is rather the feelings. No mental forces are significant unless they possess the characteristic of arousing feelings" (48–49).

3. I discuss this phenomenon in the context of psychoanalytic theories of mourning in "Grief-Work in Contemporary Cultural Criticism."

4. Recent work in anthropology also takes anger as its focal point. See Michelle Z. Rosaldo who, with Renato Rosaldo, studied the Ilongots of the Philippines. The Ilongots conceptualize anger in altogether different ways from Freud: although anger could be hidden, it was not a disturbing energy that could be repressed, buried in the unconscious. In addition, the Ilongots can be "paid" for "anger" and can simply "forget" an anger (144).

5. As Elizabeth Spelman observes, in women "anything resembling anger is likely to be redescribed as hysteria or rage instead" (264).

6. I take a dream Freud reports earlier in *The Interpretation of Dreams* as an elementary version of the "Non Vixit" dream. The text of the dream runs as follows: "*His father was scolding him for coming home so late.*" What the dream conceals through the reversal of affect is that the son is angry at the father. The dynamic of the Oedipus complex is at its familiar work: "the original wording must have been that *he* was angry with his *father,* and that in his view his father always came home too *early* (i.e. too soon). He would have preferred it if his father had not come home *at all,* and this was the same thing as a death-wish against his father" (*SE* 4:328).

7. Here is Freud in *Totem and Taboo* on the "social emotions": "We may describe as 'social' the emotions which are determined by showing consideration for another person without taking him as a sexual object" (*SE* 13:72). In *Violent Emotions* Suzanne Retzinger, a communications scholar, argues that shame is the primary social emotion. By this she means that shame is concerned above all with the survival of a relationship. In her study of quarrels of married couples, she concludes that it is in fact *shame* that incites anger rather than anger responding *tout court* to anger.

8. Freud in *Civilization and Its Discontents:* "What began in relation to the father is completed in relation to the group. If civilization is a necessary course of development from the family to humanity as a whole, then—as a result of the inborn conflict arising from ambivalence, of the eternal struggle between the trends of love and death—there is inextricably

bound up with it an increase in the sense of guilt, which will perhaps reach heights that the individual finds hard to tolerate" (*SE* 21:133).

9. As Freud argues in "The Uncanny" (1919), "every affect belonging to an emotional impulse, whatever its kind, is transformed, if it is repressed, into anxiety" (*SE* 17:241).

10. See the chapter on "Reading Freud" in my *Aging and Its Discontents* for a discussion of "Acropolis," aging, and guilt.

11. I borrow the term "clusters" from Carol Tavris.

12. It is present in other feminist work. In much feminist pedagogy, anger has also been the emotion of choice. In *Gendered Subjects: The Dynamics of Feminist Teaching,* edited by Margo Culley and Catherine Portuges, we are brought back to a fundamentally psychoanalytic view of the strong emotions. Cully, in her chapter in the volume "Anger and Authority in the Introductory Women's Studies Classroom," asserts that "anger is a challenging and necessary part of life in the feminist classroom" (216). And in their introduction, the editors of the volume note that the model of the psychoanalytic family helps them to understand why in the feminist classroom there are "outbreaks of temper, tears, denunciation and divisiveness, notions that courses must offer total salvation or else fail, strong feelings of vulnerability, awareness that students/teacher love or hate student/teachers, that students/teachers see or reject themselves/their sisters/mothers/fathers in the course of content or interactions in the classroom" (15). But if the model helped clarify a certain aspect of a pedagogical situation, it also worked to produce this volatile, adversarial pedagogical world. The model constricts us to a hothouse vision of a two-generational family when the academy houses many and far-flung generations, which is to say that it itself embodies or is witness to a multilayered historicity. Moreover, in its emphasis on the strong emotions, the psychoanalytic model implicitly restricts us to certain forms of feeling—ambivalent and ultimately oppositional emotions. Taken to its extreme, the psychoanalytic model produces the concept of a "poisonous pedagogy" (I am here using the phrase coined by the psychoanalyst Alice Miller) or of "pedagogic violence" (here I am referring to a provocative essay by Lynn Worsham), with anger as the privileged emotion: emotion is linked to the domain of the personal, to woman, and through feminism to the political, with the classroom being the space for the drama.

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